

UNITED STATES ARMY  
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY  
INTERVIEW OF  
MG DAVID A. WHALEY  
Chief of Transportation  
CONDUCTED BY  
BENJAMIN KING  
The Center of Military History

At

The Pentagon

July 7, 1995

TAPE TRANSCRIPTION

P R O C E E D I N G S

[Summary: MG Whaley begins his interview by explaining how/why he entered the Army and chose OCS. He explains that various military schools (Basic, Advance, CGSC, War College, etc.) truly assist in preparing an officer for follow-on assignments. He further, however, decries the need for continuing education beyond the formal classroom (distance learning, professional reading) and the fledgling ability of the Army to answer this need. MG Whaley then describes the Transportation Corps involvement during Desert Shield/Storm and the lessons learned involving logistics, communication and redeployment (experience of JOPES, GTN, rail use, and shortcomings of LOGCAP). He was effusive in his praise of the efforts of several officers including a host nation officer. He concludes his interview by explaining his challenges and what he foresaw as his mission while serving as Chief of Transportation and the challenge to the Transportation Corps -- keep quality, expand capability, maintain the infrastructure, BRAC, and equipping Force XXI (tactical wheeled fleet demands attention 'the medium truck fleet is broken', automation and communication needed for movements control). He foresees a need for the Transportation Corps to have the same 'battle space awareness, flexibility, agility, and lethality that the combat arms portion of the Army is offered'.]

**MR. KING:** 7 July 1995. Oral history interview with MG David A. Whaley, Chief of Transportation. The interviewing official is

Benjamin King, Command Historian, U.S. Army Transportation Center. Good afternoon, GEN Whaley.

**MG WHALEY:** Sir. How are you?

**MR. KING:** Okay, GEN Whaley, please tell us, first of all, what prompted you to join the U.S. Army and after that, what prompted you to make it a career?

**MG WHALEY:** What prompted me to enter the Army was the fact that my personal life was in a little bit of chaos. I didn't know what I wanted to do, did not know what I wanted to be and was scrambling to get some kind of purpose and focus in my life. I was going to a junior college that I didn't want to go to, I had been asked to leave my house by my mother and I had broken up with my girlfriend. Additionally, I was working three jobs but wasn't making a whole lot of money.

So I decided that one way to put some focus and purpose into my life was to join the Army. So I enlisted in the Army as an Armor Crewman for four years with my first assignment to be in Europe. As a new soldier I found the Army to certainly put some direction and purpose in my life, really from the first day forward.

**MR. KING:** What prompted you to go OCS from that point?

**MG WHALEY:** - The short answer to why I went to Officer Candidate School was so that I could remain close to my girlfriend with whom I had just convinced to take me back. While in Advanced Individual Training at Fort Knox, we got back together (and subsequently she became my wife) Realizing that I did not now want to be assigned to Europe, I went to the first sergeant of my AIT company and asked, "How do I get out of these orders to go to Europe for four years?" And he said, "Well, you can go to Vietnam or go to OCS." So I chose OCS and the rest is history.

**MR. KING:** During the course of your career, do you feel that the Army's military education programs, such as the advance course and command general staff college, have helped you in your career?

**MG WHALEY:** Absolutely. I think it's a great progressive and continuing education program In many ways probably the best in the world. It is clearly the envy of most other national military educational programs. The program provides far more than just tactical and technical skills. It's, purposefully or



not, a time when officers, soldiers, and non-commissioned officers are given an opportunity to reflect on what they do, why they do it, who they are, and where they're going. It's a brief respite in that you can take a look at who you are, where you're really going, and is what you're doing the right thing.

In addition, the institution itself provides an unequalled opportunity to prepare you for your next series of assignments.

I think the Army educational institutions are doing an absolutely exquisite job of that. I think the piece that needs to be looked at is what is you done between the formal resident pieces to keep service members abreast of what's going on and to grow as a person and as a professional. That piece, the self-study piece, is what I think the institution needs to focus on. I think the institution should hold individuals responsible for continuing their education between resident school assignments.

Toward this end, we do have a required reading list, but we really don't enable it. Individuals must search out the list itself and, then, search out the books that are required reading and recommended reading. In reality there's no formal program truly supported by the Army.

My solution would be to issue every officer a library upon being commissioned. And, then, reinforce it through individual and unit training outside of the TRADOC institutional training.

That has really fallen upon deaf ears throughout my career because it could be a relatively expensive program and would require a great deal of investment. So officers, NCOs and soldiers are left to do it on their own. I think the guidance that most leaders should give to their subordinates is to never stop reading, always stay in school, and to always look to the future.

**MR. KING:** Do you think there might be a possibility to do that now that we have CD's where you don't have the heavy weight of the books and the expense of the books?

**MG WHALEY:** Certainly. I think distributed learning, distributed teaching, distance learning and distance teaching is here. It's already here. We're doing a pretty good job at enabling that but it's like building a better mousetrap and the people will come. Our "Classroom of the Future" here at Fort Eustis, I think, is a great example of that.

We published the 88 Mike CD-ROM without giving units and soldiers CD ROM capable computers. Well, they've already got it. Many of our soldiers, NCOs, and officers and civilians already have their own personal computer so you get on the Internet or the World Wide Web and there it is. But learning of that nature needs to be done, and the Army must require, enable and reinforce this type of learning

I think every service member and DOD civilian have access through distance learning to the information. But there also needs to be another forum to exchange ideas. You read it. I read it. We come away with two different understandings. . Well, let's talk about it. Let's exchange the ideas and really leverage each other's understanding. That piece still isn't there - need to have virtual classrooms and chat rooms.

**MR. KING:** Getting back to your personal career, would you just go over the major assignments you had from battalion commander on up?

**MG WHALEY:** I commanded the 11th Battalion at Ft. Story, Virginia from 1984 to 1986. From there, I went to the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, '86-'87; '87-'88, I was a War Planner on the Joint Staff JCS. From there, I commanded the 7th Group for 27 months here at Ft. Eustis, Virginia, and took it to Saudi Arabia, changed command in Saudi Arabia in November of '90. From November of '90 to September of '91, I was the Deputy Commanding General for Operations and Transportation, 22nd Support Command in Saudi Arabia for Desert Storm/Desert Shield/Desert Farewell.

I left in September 1991 and took command of the Military Traffic Management Command, Eastern Area. I commanded that through July of '93. In July of '93 to July of '95, I've been the Commanding General at Ft. Eustis and the Army's Chief of Transportation.

**MR. KING:** Okay. Going back to Desert Shield/Desert Storm, I suppose I'm going to ask a loaded question. As the group commander, do you feel that your deployment plans were adequate at the time?

**MG WHALEY:** Deployment plans.

**MR. KING:** And I know that's a loaded question.

**MG WHALEY:** Yes, it is a loaded question. What everybody should understand is that we didn't plan to go to Saudi Arabia or Iraq



or Kuwait. We planned to go to the other side of the Persian Gulf, facing a different enemy in a different terrain and really a totally different method to the equation.

The bottom line was I got a call from Forces Command on the 9th of August. We arrived in Saudi Arabia on the 11th of August with about just under 400 folks and the rest of the group followed shortly thereafter.

**MR. KING:** Okay. The sphere of logistics, the branch history, says you arrived with approximately 300 people. Okay.

**MG WHALEY:** And that's a true statement.

**MR. KING:** How did you go about selecting those people?

**MG WHALEY:** Who? To be honest with you, my initial vision of that operation was that I needed to send a Battalion Task Force to Saudi Arabia and that the Group and the group headquarters would follow. A great visionary, a great senior officer, then MG, now LTG (ret.) Sam Wakefield, called me up and said, "Okay. How are you going to do this thing?" I briefed what I was going to do and he said, "No. You're going and you're taking the group headquarters, minus/plus the battalion and headquarters minus and you'll take stevedore capability, airfield capability, movements control capability, and watercraft capability to do the download in the American Comerant and operate those crafts."

In retrospect, the absolute correct answer. He knew and saw the equation much better than I. When it got to selecting who would go, at that time the 11th Battalion was structured as a LOTS battalion, the 6th Battalion is a truck battalion, the 10th Battalion is a boat battalion, and the 24th as a terminal and stroke multi-functional battalion. Therefore, the 24th Battalion headquarters was, to me, the most logical answer, commanded by LTC James "Sluggo" Ebertowski . I lead the Task Force and we took a slice of the group staff and some of the Battalion staff as well. We selected mostly terminal service units from the 24th Battalion and a watercraft surge team from the 10th Battalion to download the American Comerant and we took the 870th Transportation Company, a Cargo Transfer Unit from the 6th Battalion.

**MR. KING:** Okay. Going back just a little bit before you -- when you got on the ground, how did you establish your priorities? In other words, what did you see that made you establish those priorities and how did you go about that?

**MG WHALEY:** When I got off the airplane, then MG Gus Pagonis was the senior logistician had been given the mission to provide logistical support to the theater. His initial comment to me was, "You are no longer the Commander of 7th Transportation Group. You are now a staff officer working for me. I will take your task force and they will become the core to create the staff of the newly formed 22nd Support Command." It was not truly a Support Command at that point and the 7th Transportation Group became genesis of the 22nd SUPCOM..

The flexibility and adaptability displayed by the members of the 7th Group was absolutely amazing. For instance, we asked one of our Marine Warrant Officers to perform procurement functions and interface with the Saudi government representatives. We had transporters doing supply and maintenance, contracting, and everything that a full SUPCOM staff would do.

The Group Staff and the 24th Battalion personnel performed magnificently. They really filled out General Pagonis' staff and brought instant capability to bear. He had about 12 people that he deployed with him and the Group filled out his staff for about three weeks. I believe the first ship was discharged - on my birthday, the 17th of August.

LTC Ebertowski and I went to the Saudi Port of Damman and negotiated its use by American Forces. LTC Ebertowski essentially became the port commander at that point. He and his units executed the reception, staging and on-ward movement missions for the entire theater. MAJ Greg Cox from Ebertowski's staff was assigned the mission, along with the 870th Terminal Transfer Company to expand and mature the operation of the Dhahran Airfield.

We split that 300 or so guys between the staff of the Support Command running the airfield, running the seaport of Damman, scrounging for transportation supplies, all kinds of field service business, and really laying the groundwork for GEN Pagonis to build the 22nd SUPCOM, open and operate all seaports and airports for US use and establish a theater-wide logistics capability.

**MR. KING:** Okay. How did you handle your relationship within the host nation?

**MG WHALEY:** My personal relationship turned out to be very, very good. GEN Pagonis sent me to Jubayl, which was the northernmost port to meet a Saudi military official whose name is MAJ Ali ,



now LTC Ali, appointed by the King as the King's personal representative for all port-related activities.

I first met him in Jubayl on the 13th or 14th of August. LTC Ebertowski and I met him again on the 15th or 16th in the port of Dammam. He is an extraordinarily, intelligent individual that understood the breadth and depth of what was coming and essentially turned the entire port of Dammam over to us.

Over the next days, weeks, and months we developed a very good personal and professional relationship. A great visionary, a great operator, result-oriented individual that given the information could make anything happen. More importantly, he had the power to do so, the vision and the intellect to execute it, and I can't recall of any time he said "no" to me. So my personal and professional relationship with the Saudi government and Saudi officials was extraordinary. They went to extremes to provide the goods and services we needed and in some cases, advised us on how to do things better. Our relationship with Saudi Leadership was truly exceptional and they consistently displayed a phenomenal spirit of cooperation.

The Saudi cooperation and specifically Major Ali's efforts, went far beyond the use of their facilities. He was instrumental in arranging for the lease of thousands of commercial trucks. He found quarters for our soldiers, he provided security for our convoys, obtained convoy clearance for us, and really allowed us how to do things that, without him, just could not have been done. Major Ali was absolutely critical to the success of the entire transportation and logistics mission of Operation Desert Shield, Desert Storm and Desert Farewell.

**MR. KING:** Did the air entry work as well?

**MG WHALEY:** The air entry worked as well, but GEN Pagonis' headquarters was located on the Dhahran Airfield and he was the principal interface with the Saudi Air Force.

He and eventually COL Steve Koons, who commanded the 1st Area Support Group, developed a great relationship with the Saudi Air Force. This same relationship existed throughout the Kingdom and into the operation of numerous airfields across the country. It was all done very well. The only limits that we encountered were physical limits.

If the airfield didn't have enough space to park airplanes, well, there was nothing anybody can do immediately about that.

But I can also tell you that they took all reasonable measures possible to satisfy our requirements. They expended great efforts to improve our operational capacity as well as life support capability at every airfield we opened to include the airfields at KKMC, Riyadh, Dammam, and King Fahd. Just what do you need?

During the initial deployment phase our soldiers were standing in the dirt, in the sand, no tents, with just boxes of bottled -  
- warm bottled water.

By the time we began to redeploy the force out of Saudi Arabia, the Saudi government, in conjunction with the American government at Dhahran particularly, had constructed enclosures that were air conditioned, had water, showers, food, television, cold water -- and it just was a totally different environment a short eight months later.

**MR. KING:** Okay. With all of the stuff that was coming in, were you helped by any of the deployment computer programs like JOPES or TCACCIS or any of this or any of the other --

**MG WHALEY:** Yes. A difficult question. And it is important to remember that "the truth is seen through the eyes of the beholder and from where you sit, what you see". I guess my personal and professional evaluation is that we knew when airplanes were coming but didn't necessarily know whether there were soldiers on them, unit equipment on them, or supplies on them. Detail beyond that was not available. That's on the air side.

On the sea side, we had some communication problems initially receiving manifests. The manifests from the MTMC community were great when we got them. And typically for unit equipment, they were superb. Documentation for unit equipment aboard ships was not a problem because they were shipped directly from the CONUS port to Saudi Arabia. No change in load. What left (CONUS) got there (Saudi Arabia). Commercial container documentation however was a completely different story.

We routinely knew when a ship was coming but did not have the detail of which containers were on that ship or the detail of what was in each of the containers. We also did not have visibility of which containers were staged at intermediate ports in the Mediterranean so we could start managing the call forward rather than letting the commercial carrier decide which



containers were delivered first. So I guess the answer is "yes" and "no" in direct answer to your question.

**MR. KING:** This is jumping ahead a little bit to the Chief of Transportation questions. But do you see anything coming in the future that would help that situation?

**MG WHALEY:** Yes. There's a great many initiatives that we've taken since then to resolve that issue. The Global Transportation Network is one of those, an improvement of JOPES to GCCS, to global command and control system, will take us a long way. But there's some disconnects in it. We've got a lot of work yet to do.

We are focused properly through the Department of Defense Total Asset Visibility Program; the Army slice of that and U.S. TRANSCOM is completely engaged in that. We are focused properly. We are moving properly, but not as fast as I would like us to see nor as deep as I would like us to see.

By deep, I mean, we are really engaged in the strategic piece of the issue. and we are relatively engaged at the operational level.

But we still are very deficient in addressing the tactical issues, if you will, down at the company, battalion, and brigade level in terms of enabling those folks to tell us what they have, what they need, what's enroute.

The "total asset visibility" envisions complete knowledge from the time a requisition is submitted until the person that submitted that requisition gets the item. Everyone knows or has visibility of the item in real-time, all the time. The technology clearly exists to do that, but we have not been successful in obtaining and deploying it yet. We still have to say -- "It left the port yesterday." "Well, where is it?" "I don't know." "Did it get there yet?" "Well, it's not here yet." "Well, it's somewhere between here and there."

We need to have real-time total asset visibility so it's not just repair parts, it's not just food, and it's not just unit equipment. It's people, it's blood, it's building materials, and it's Class 7 that's going in to replace other broken pieces of stuff or battle damaged stuff. It's the retrograde of all of that. It's the tactical move - it is all classes of supplies and people.

If we move the 7th and 18th Corps around -- well, they're moving. Tell me when you're all done.

Battle space situational awareness of everything on the battlefield is technically feasible. It is not physically feasible at this point nor are we really in the in-depth discussion of what the requirement is yet. It's really "I need to be omnipotent". Well, what does that mean? How do you break that down into eachees and wheres and whyfores? How do you connect all of that? And that's coming. I think that's part of Force XXI and Force XXI will, hopefully, take us to it.

**MR. KING:** I realize that the Saudis did not have a lot of rail. They did not have a lot of rail capability.

**MG WHALEY:** They had some..

**MR. KING:** Did we use that capability?

**MG WHALEY:** Yes. They had one rail line that was significant to the situation. They had an east/west rail line from Dammam to Riyadh. We used that extensively for containers, unit equipment principally, and ammunition on occasion. We used it to the full extent of its capacity.

But if you can picture a map of Saudi Arabia with Dammam on the East Coast, Riyadh kind of in the center of the country and KKMC kind of in the north central piece of Saudi Arabia, it forms a triangle. We overwhelmed the road space using the eastern leg to move units, equipment, and supplies to KKMC.

The southern/western leg is longer than the eastern leg. So what the rail provided us was a shorter distance to be traverse by truck. We didn't have to take the east/west, then north/south piece so we could fill up the eastern leg, use both truck and rail to do the east/west piece and, then go north/south on the far leg with truck. So it enhanced the efficiency of our limited truck fleet and improved the overall movement equation. The deployment and forward movement of our forces would have been significantly impaired without the railroad.

**MR. KING:** Was the rail run primarily by the Saudis?

**MG WHALEY:** Absolutely. Totally by the Saudis other than the loading and discharge of railcars.



**MR. KING:** Okay. Did we have any kind of contract supervision capability there or liaison with them?

**MG WHALEY:** Yes. They provided service in-kind. The only thing we needed to say was I want the trains to go from here/there at this time so many times a day or week or whatever.

We did not supervise the operation of the trains other than scheduling but if we needed to, we certainly had plenty of contract supervision to do that. But really it was we loaded the railcars, we'd turn the train over to the Saudis. They took it to the other end, and then we discharged it, and they came back and got some more.

**MR. KING:** Okay. In the middle of trying to get all of the forces, all of the equipment on the ground, did you find the daily mission changing drastically?

**MG WHALEY:** In direct answer to your question, yes. And it was not a daily mission, at least, for the first 60 to 90 days. It was an hourly mission because the mission involved the support requirements and the movement requirements really evolved hourly, we did not have a detailed plan. But who deployed when and when they got there and where they were going was all done concurrently. Therefore, it was more a series of "react" events than it was a planned sequence of events but I don't know if it could have been done much better even with a "plan" but it certainly could have been "easier".

What continues to amaze me to this day is the versatility and flexibility and agility of American soldiers, non-commissioned, and officers. Now I've got a prejudice view towards transporters but let me tell you, those guys did anything and everything they were asked to do and they did it exceptionally well without supervision. They were given mission orders daily and just went out and executed those to a phenomenal degree.

**MR. KING:** Did you get involved initially in the support of the 82nd and the Air Force as soon as you got on the ground?

**MG WHALEY:** With the 82nd, yes. In fact, when I talk to folks about those early days, I tell them that my greatest fear in the first several weeks was that 82nd Airborne soldiers would die because I couldn't get them water, food, ammunition or fuel.

We brought the first forklift into the theater and but had no trucks. None. There was a lot of discussion around this LOGCAP

business and contractors on the battlefield. Well, pretty much through the entire months of August and September, the ride between Dhahran Airfield and Dammam was an easy ride because there wasn't anyone else on the highway. There were no trucks. There were no cars. There was no one. All the contractors and civilians had left.

The eastern province of Saudi Arabia was vacant. The port had no stevedores. The port director was there with his security force and a couple of guys. End of story. That was it.

So my concern around the 82nd was how to buy some water and if I can get some food off the PREPO afloat ships, how do I get it to the 82nd? No transportation assets - no trucks. Nor were there any buses. How do I get 82nd soldiers from Dammam Airfield out to their tactical assembly area? No buses. Nothing. When we found a bus or a truck and leased it, we had great celebration because one is a whole lot better than none. And that got better over time. But it also got worse over time.

When we finally got some and then Saddam decided to send a SCUD or whatever later on in the deployment process, all of those trucks disappeared since their drivers would drive away from the Eastern Province. They all went away. So there's a great risk attendant with LOGCAP and commercially provided support - they are not soldiers - they can leave when and if they want to. The risk is that American soldiers will die because a contractor left the battlefield.. The conduct of war is not an economic process. It is a "risk assessment" process and my hope this that we do not let "economics" determine what is and what is not acceptable risk. So I think there's some good lessons learned and more to be learned.

**MR. KING:** Okay, sir, we were discussing initially the changing mission. When -- in October when you relinquished command of the 7th Group, you were assigned as GEN Pagonis deputy. Did your mission change really that much?

**MG WHALEY:** My personal mission changed considerably. Where I was the commander of a group organization with functional capability, I was, then, given the requirement not only for modal organization but movements management as well. We eventually established three additional truck groups, two area support groups, a separate area support battalion, a theater movements control agency, a separate movements control battalion, a transportation group (composite) as well as separate aviation and engineer battalions.



**MR. KING:** Well, since you mentioned movement control, when was movement control or when did the MCA finally get on the ground?

**MG WHALEY:** To be honest, I forget the exact date, but I think it was October. In any case it was far too late. A lesson learned, and it's now in our doctrine, to deploy movement control capability early in the process. The history of warplanes and Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the balance of combat force versus supporting forces getting into a theater is a very difficult balance to maintain, particularly when the enemy threat is emerging and changing. And keeping that balance so that you can not only deploy the force, move it to the TAA, and sustain it at the same time.

So the "deploy phase" lasts for about a day, and then, you're in the deploy and sustain phases. That lasts just a very little time, and then you're in the deploy, sustain, and tactically relocate, as well as begin some retrograde actions, and the mission is expanding all the time. So it's really an emerging requirement and the MET-T changes constantly. Change evolves is the answer, and you've got to be in a position to respond and accommodate that change. I think our forces did an absolutely superb job of that. We thought we were over the hump when we closed the last division of the 18th Airborne Corps. Then the call came - "The 7<sup>th</sup> Corps is coming and they are coming quickly." So the mission is to double the force in half the time, and oh, by the way, continue to sustain the 18<sup>th</sup> ABC, and build up, at each echelon, the supplies and material needed to support two Corps for 30 days of warfare. So the equation becomes quite complex at an increasing rate.

**MR. KING:** Speaking of sustainment, you mentioned you brought the first forklift. Was that on a prepo ship, or where did that come from --

**MG WHALEY:** No. We flew it in.

**MR. KING:** You flew it in.

**MG WHALEY:** The 7<sup>th</sup> Group Advanced Party deployed from Fort Eustis via Langley AFB aboard one C-5 and one C-141. I flew in the C-5 and LTC Ebertowski was in the C-141. We brought, I think, a deuce-and-a-half, a couple of CUC-V's, and three or four, forklifts to be used to operate the airfield. The forklifts are used to move the pallets the truck for aerial put clearance. We also deployed some HMMWVs for command and control. Obviously, I think there were some Air Force forklifts there that the Air

Force had flown in earlier but forklifts remained a shortage item throughout the war.

**MR. KING:** Were there any forklifts on any of the propositioned equipment?

**MG WHALEY:** Yes.

**MR. KING:** Oh, okay.

**MG WHALEY:** When we discharged the prepo ships, the first ones we discharged had food and ammunition on them. Next we unloaded the ships with the MHE trucks, rough terrain container handlers (RTCH) and class 4. The entire prepositioned afloat project was put together by now retired General Jimmy D. Ross and it was perfect. Every piece that was on there was right, every piece was needed. That's an Army success story of huge proportions. The lesson learned is bring an ammo squad in with you so that you capture the right data for the ammo guys when they finally get there.

We captured the transportation data. COL Ebertowski and his guys did a great, great job in capturing the transportation data. So we could account for each round in a transportation sense. However, what we couldn't or didn't do was, here's the lot number, the DODIC, the data that the ordnance community needed. That's been fixed, doctrinally, and it's been fixed organizationally.

**MR. KING:** The next step up from forklifts. When did the first RTCH's arrive?

**MG WHALEY:** The RTCH's were on the prepo ships. An absolutely critical piece of equipment. I never had too many and could have used more. There's a shortage in the Army today of somewhere between two hundred and four hundred, because they're such a versatile piece of equipment and required not only to deploy but to sustain the force as well.

**MR. KING:** Okay. Who's responsible for the transportation liaison with the Navy, the Marines, and the Air Force?

**MG WHALEY:** A great question. J-4, CENTCOM.

**MR. KING:** Did you get involved in that in any way?



**MG WHALEY:** Yes, I certainly did. And that piece, in retrospect, I could have been done a lot better job. Navy first. Not a real problem with MSC. MSC had elements right there with us so that worked very well. Not much problem with the Air Force air flow other than the detail that I mentioned previously. I didn't really know what was on the aircraft in time to do something about it. Support to the Air Force and support to the Marines, we supported the Marines pretty well because they were right there with us. They were in the eastern province with us. And typically, support for the Air Force was not done well by anyone. I failed and the institution failed.

I couldn't project the requirement in time to do something about it. The support we provided was always "reactive" vs "proactive". If you considered where the Air Force was, other than Dhahran, they were in central and western Saudi Arabia, a two-day travel from where most of the Transportation assets were. I was asked several times to support the Air Force with less than 24-hour notice. We could not respond fast enough due to the time-distance equation. I requested that the Air Force project their requirements and we would attempt to satisfy them. This never came to fruition. The Air Force did what they needed to do. They went out and leased their own trucks. I failed to successfully work with the Air Force and accommodate their requests.

What I should have done was sent somebody to the Air Force and said, "Okay, here's my liaison. You tell this guy what you need." He could call me, and I lease the trucks. I should have assigned a truck unit in direct support co-located with them but I did not. Should have. It's the Army's mission to do it and if anybody messed it up, it was me. Enough said.

**MR. KING:** Okay. Speaking of trucks, when did the first trucks arrive? Did they arrive with the units?

**MG WHALEY:** There were some in prepo, very few, but most arrived as units. It became very clear very early that surface transportation was going to be a significant problem. The Saudis helped significantly. The Saudis through MAJ ALI provided the first HETs of any number and they moved the 24<sup>th</sup> Division. The 24th HET Company came in; we used them, the 18th Airborne Corps and the 7th Corps were very cooperative in using their HETs as well. They allowed us to use Corps and Divisions HETs to perform port clearance and we then released them back to perform the tactical and operational functions and it worked very well.

However, never had too many HETs. That lesson has been learned. The Army is buying roughly 1,300 new HETs. I've forgotten the number now, but it was in the 500 range is what the Army owned Army-wide at that time. The requirement for HETs was somewhere around 1,400, and that was the absolute minimum required to tactically repositioned both Corps. And we never really got there. The Saudis, provided their military HETs, the Egyptians sent a company, actually a battalion, and we procured, borrowed and leased HETs from all over the world.

**MR. KING:** Do you think that, as far as trucks are concerned, as far as HETs are concerned, the prepos should be done differently?

**MG WHALEY:** The prepo is getting right. I think we're approaching over 100 HETs in prepo. But that piece has been directly addressed, fixed in the 80 to 90 percent range. But, again, given the time, distance requirement to move the now ARW-3 stuff, there's a balance between HETs, tanks, Bradleys, and risk. And I'm relatively satisfied with the way that that's being addressed now.

**MR. KING:** Okay. Going back a little bit, you mentioned the fact that you felt that movement control had arrived in the theater too late and that it has been corrected doctrinally.

**MG WHALEY:** By that, what I mean is that embedded in the Third Army headquarters, today, there is an active movements control element that's part of the 3rd Theater Army Movements Control Agency. During Dessert Storm they arrived late and we performed theater level movements control with battalions and movements control teams the wrong answer. Given such a fluid situation - information and understanding grew exponentially -and data grew exponentially as well as information. The sooner you were there, the sooner you got understanding. The later you got there, the more you had to understand and the more complex the operation became, both for materiel management and movements control. Both those organizations came in later than they should have.

Exacerbating that situation was that, as an institution, we had not trained either of those organizations adequately in the breadth, depth, and complexity of a theater organization. Yes, they are theater organizations but we do not, routinely, conduct theater exercises of that magnitude and or complexity. Given that equation, the units did okay. It was done through hard work of captains, lieutenants, NCOs, and soldiers.



**MR. KING:** It's nearly a cliché now, but the communications equipment for the MCA in Saudi was not really adequate. No?

**MG WHALEY:** No. There was no logistics organization that I know of in Saudi Arabia that had adequate communications.

**MR. KING:** Is that being corrected now doctrinally?

**MG WHALEY:** It is doctrinally and in a TOE sense, being corrected. But it's also another physical constraint that will take some time to correct. We communicated with car phones. Then COL Mike Gaw, now BG Mike Gaw, communicated via car phone. He had thousands of trucks under his command and control and had to use a car phone - - we can do better than that.

I talked to Mike Gaw probably every 30 minutes on the telephone. I don't know how he got his information. It's a testimony to the ingenuity of our soldiers and non-commissioned officers. I would say that the accuracy of our data in terms of what we moved, what we didn't move, and where our trucks were, was in the 80 percent range. Not by any stretch of the imagination where it should have been, but 80 wasn't bad when you had less than a dozen or so mobile phones as your communications net.

That brings me to something that I think is relatively unique to the Transportation Corps in transportation operations. Our soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and officers all understand what operational success looks like. They know what information is critical and they know what operations are critical. They don't need close supervision, they don't need much direction, and they automatically report the data that's required. Our soldiers, non-commissioned and officers can be trusted. They will always report honestly. If it's bad, they'll give it to you bad. If it's good, they'll give it to you good. They're not going to put a spin on it, one way or the other.

And time after time after time, the data that I got was just great. It certainly was not adequate in everything that I wanted, but given the capacity that they had to gather and transmit data, it was phenomenal. Again, a testimony to the professional of our soldiers and NCO's.

**MR. KING:** When did you start planning for the redeployment?

**MG WHALEY:** Actually, another very visionary guy is GEN Pagonis. During Desert Shield before the war started, he established a planning element called the "Log Cell" that was given the

mission of "future planning" to include redeployment. What he didn't know was how quick, how many, to where, which one first, et cetera, but he was certainly planning it. I think the surprise that we got was the war lasted only 100 hours. And 24 hours later we were directed to have 5,000 soldiers on airplanes on their way home. The Chief Staff of the Army, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs said, "Send them home." It may have been 72 or 66 hours later but it seemed like a nanosecond, and -- so -- -- it wasn't a "no plan redeployment" but it was certainly more "reactive" than proactive.

The resilience of the folks, and it's not just transporters. GEN Ken Guest was the Deputy Commanding General for Operations. He doesn't get enough credit for what he and his folks did. He had all the quartermaster and ordnance guys, principally, and did a phenomenal job in mission areas they don't typically perform. We don't train Corps Support Groups to wash vehicles or set up reception areas to perform reception staging and onward movement. But it didn't matter whether it was a quartermaster or ordnance or transportation unit. The guys just went out and did it and did it magnificently.

If I recall accurately, the 3rd ACR was the first unit back. It came into Jubayl and we had nothing for them. They got back before we could do anything. It took us several days to respond to that before we were adequately supporting them. These guys had been living in their tanks for months. Well, now everything's got to come out, all the tanks must be washed, all property must be accounted for, turn-in all ammunition, give them clean clothes, give them baths, give them meals, and there was just no structure there to do it.

GEN Guest led the charge and did a phenomenal job. His folks and the transporters and all the rest just -- said, "Okay, we can do this." And they did it.

**MR. KING:** Moving forward to your assignment as Chief of Transportation, when you were appointed Chief of Transportation, what did you see as your goals and what did you see as your major challenges?

**MG WHALEY:** My goals were to take the Corps into the 21st Century or lay the groundwork for the Corps to move into and perform in the 21st Century, both organizationally, institutionally, professionally, and doctrinally. To enable the Corps, in a materiel sense and in a leader development sense. To create a climate across the Corps that -- reinforce the climate, really,



that we don't do this as individual units, we do it collectively. If a transportation piece fails somewhere, then the entire Corps fails. The sense of wherever you are as a transporter, the Corps depends on you, and what do we need to do collectively is enable each individual and each unit to succeed. That was kind of my vision, plus life's too short; have a good time in what we're doing, rejoice in the successes that we have daily. Find better ways to do it, break the paradigms.

The challenges were really that 42 percent of the Corps was COMPO-4 -- which means it doesn't exist anywhere -- and it was getting larger. The schoolhouse, as of today, has taken a 67 percent reduction in officers. The CASCOR reorganization changed significantly the way business was done for the Transportation Corps in a doctrinal combat development and curriculum development sense. I don't have a better solution to that, but my challenge is to find the ways to keep the quality and expand the capability -- a perpendicular fight.

The other challenges were, and I think still are, the installation is under-funded. There are 50 percent fewer civilians on this installation today than there were in 1990. While the mission, in fact, has grown. The infrastructure has not, historically, been invested in the way that it should have. So we're into spending \$15,000 to \$18,000 a week, rather than the \$30,000 required. So we're into patch and repair rather than invest in the infrastructure.

Now that I've given you the downside of that, both CASCOR and TRADOC have done what I think is an exceptionally reasonable job in bringing it back up. Now, it's an annual fight, but they've given us more money to fix some billets. The Department of the Army has given us some money through ASMP to fix some of the infrastructure for deployment and to train for deployment. The DOD community, to include U.S. TRANSCOM, has allowed us to shift some missions around to keep some of our folks here by doing things not only for the Army, but also for DOD.

The other major challenge we faced was BRAC. BRAC was like this huge, dark cloud overshadowing Ft. Eustis and all of its people and Ft. Story. I can't give enough credit to the Virginia Congressional Delegation, the Mayor, the local city councils of Williamsburg, Newport News, and Hampton, to COL (Retired) Dan Shellabarger, and all the people here, the staff at Ft. Eustis, the Department of the Army staff, particularly Mark O'Konski and GEN Monty Montero and his folks as well, GEN Johnnie Wilson and

his staff at DA DCSLOG. Just a community effort of significant proportions to run at this BRAC issue.

**MR. KING:** A final question. Where do you see the Transportation Corps -- where it fits, how it functions, and how it's equipped -- in Force XXI?

**MG WHALEY:** I think the Transportation Corps becomes even more important in Force XXI. CONUS-based power projection, highly mobile, lethal, agile, flexible, combat organizations, can't get to nor be sustained without us. The functionality of the Transportation Corps is the law of physics. Combat equipment must be moved by trucks, boats, planes, or airplanes through, airports, seaports, and rail, until the "Starship Enterprise" has been filled and even then an Army Transporter will be at the controls.

In regards to "equipping" Force XXI, the watercraft portion is in pretty good shape and well done. The heavy truck side, is also in good shape. However, the medium truck fleet is broken. I think the tactical wheeled vehicle fleet, save the heavy trucks, (HETs) is broken. The Army is taking it a piece at a time. We ought to be investing \$900 million a year. We're doing about 150 million a year. By the year 2010, the truck fleet will be absolutely inoperative. Movements control is coming into its own and moving forward nicely that's the wave of the future. But we're not automating it properly nor do we have the information systems or communication capability needed to properly enable the function.

So I think we're in a great period of transition. We've got to keep focused that there's a near, mid-, and long-term portion of this journey. The near portion -- do the best you can with what we have. Mid term -- we must use as much technology as we can and use our equipment to improve our current fleets of equipment. Long-term -- the Corps needs the same kind of battle space awareness, flexibility, agility, and lethality that the combat arms portion of the Army is offered.

The real bottom line is whatever the requirement is, our soldiers, noncommissioned officers, officers, and civilians will make it happen. They will do more than we ever thought that they could do, and they will do it with whatever we have to give them to do it with. They will find ways to do it better. I don't think there's a more innovative, focused, capable Corps in the Army, and we handicap them with our antique equipment, poor



communication and outdated actions. However, they routinely excel, even given those handicaps.

**MR. KING:** Do you see Force XXI causing a significant change in the transportation training structure, such as the school and AIT and things like that?

**MG WHALEY:** Well, it's Army XXI, I think, that will take us to more distance learning, will take us to a more information-based view and operational parameters to where you're delivering exactly and only what's needed on time, in the right place, the first time. And that's going to take a change in the way we move material, a 915 and an 872 trailer moving 40 tons down the road may be the way we've done it efficiently in the past. Large trucks, large volumes.

In the future, effectiveness is the more important issue, and that may be a smaller truck or it may be a helicopter or may be a fixed wing or whatever, a Starship Enterprise. But the effectiveness will have to be greater. So effectiveness becomes the watchword rather than efficiency. And, in fact, as long as we don't have the Starship Enterprise, what we may find is smaller trucks, more of them, going faster with greater mobility. And the same with ships, airplanes, and that sort of thing.

**MR. KING:** Thank you, sir.